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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LA

~L\H

PEAY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.HO.\ ltD OF EDUCATION OF

PROVO CITY SCHOOL DIST.,
a body corporate and politic, and

MERRILL CHRISTOPHERSON,
HAY MURDOCK, SHIRLEY
PAXMAN, WILFORD E. SMITH,
and LA :MAR EMPEY,
:Members of Said Board,
Defendan.ts and Respondents.

Case
No. 9722

BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANT
STATElYIENT OF THE CASE

This is an action to decide the constitutionality and
validity of Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961,
cited UCA 1953, 53-7-24, and the validity of the election
held in Provo City February 6, 1962, pursuant to this act.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

This case is an appeal by the plaintiff, LaMar Peay,
from a summary judgment rendered June 29, 1962, to the
effect that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Utah Legislature in 1961 passed Section 11,
Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, which is also cited as
UCA, 53-7-24, and is here stated in its entirety:
"53-7-24. VoTED LEEWAY PROGRAM: AuTHORIZEDELECTION REQUIREMENTS.-With the consent of a
majority of the electors of the district voting at
an election or elections held for that purpose in
the manner set forth in Section 53-2-12, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, any district may maintain a
school program in excess of the cost of the program referred to in sections 53-7-22 and 53-7-23
above. Said additional program shall be known as
the "voted leeway" program of the district. Said
voted leeway program shall not exceed an amount
equal to 20% of the basic program of the district.
''Consideration of such additional program and of
modification, increases or decreases thereof by
such elections may be initiated by a petition signed
by electors of the district equal to 10% of the number of electors who voted at a preceding election
on said question or by action of the board of education. A subsequent election upon the question
of modifying or increasing such an additional program shall not be deemed to constitute a reconsideration of the existing additional voted leeway
program unless the proposition submitted to the
electors expressly so states. Accordingly, a majority vote opposing said modification or increase
shall not be deemed to deprive the district of authority to continue said existing voted leeway
program. Nothing contained in this section shall
be construed as terminatilJg without an election,
thereon, the authority of any school district to
continue an existing voted additional program
heretofore authorized by the voters.''
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.\ ftPr the passage of this law and pursuant to its authorization the Provo City Board of Education caused an
e1t•dion to he held in Provo City, Utah, on the following
proposition (R-23):
"Shall the Board of Education of Provo City,
State of Utah, be authorized to maintain a 'voted
lreway' program as provided in Section 11, ChaptPr 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, not to exceed ten per
eent (10%) of the minimum basic program provided by law."
In this election all persons entitled to vote for general
office8 of the statr without regard to any property qualification were allowed to vote. The result of the election
was:

For said proposition: 2,224
•.f.rtai nsf said proposition: 1,829

After this election appellant brought an action to determine the constitutionality and validity of the act, the
validity of the election and to enjoin the respondents from
any action pursuant to the election. Respondents filed an
answer and thereafter made a Motion for Summary J udgment. This Motion was granted by the lower court and
judgment entered dismissing appellant's complaint for
failing to state a claim. (R-29)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant contends that plaintiff's complaint did
statp a cause of action and asks that the decision of the
trial judge be reversed, and that U·CA 1953, 53-7-24 he
3
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1
declared unconstitutional and a nullity and that the election of February 6, 1962, be declared null and void.

ARGUl\iENT
POINT

I.

THE STATUTE RELIED ON BY DEFENDANTS IN CALLING THE "LEEWAY" ELECTION IS SO VAGUE, INDEFINITE, AND
UNCERTAIN THAT IT SHOULD BE DECLARED A NULLITY.
The ''Leeway'' election causing the dispute before
the Court is based on Chapter 104, Section 11, Laws of
Utah, 1961 (53-7-24, DCA 1953). The pertinent part of
this statute reads :
''With the consent of a majority of the electors of
the district voting at an election or elections held
for that purpose in the manner set forth in Section 53-2-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, any district may maintain a school program in excess of
. the cost of the program referred to in Sections
53-7-22 and 53-7-23 above ... "
A problem immediately arises, because the section referred to as 53-2-12, DCA, 1953 concerns the general powers and duties of the State Board of Education, and says
nothing about elections. Thus the statute, as considered
(the bill as introduced contained the same reference) and
enacted by the legislature, sets forth no provisions for
holding a "leeway" election. The act should therefore
fail on this ground. It might be said that the legislature
has made an obvious mistake in referring to UCA 1953,
A
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;,:~-~-1 ~. and that it must have intended reference to an-

other section. Respondents contend that the Court should
rPad a st atutP that was repealed before Section 53-7-24
was I'Tl:t<'h'<l and from this reading determine that the
!t'.gi:·dat 11re intended to include a different reference in
th body of Section 53-7-24. They argue that Section
;>:~-7 -~4 is a replacement for Section 53-7-8, and that since
;,:~-7-8 made reference to 53-7-12 the Court must conelude
that the legislature intended to refer to 53-7-12 when it
Pnndl'd 53-7-24. (Section 53-7-12 has to do with special
Pll'd ions called for the purpose of creating a special tax
to buy and erect schoolhouses.) In support of their position, respondents cite eases where the Courts have corrPctPd obvious legislative errors. However, it is important to note here that in this case the legislature at no
time considered any reference to any section other than
5:~-~-1~. since the bill was introduced with the same statutory reference it had when it was passed. Respondents
are therefore hard pressed to argue which section the
legislature intended to refer to, since reference to no other
section appears in the legislative record.
Appellant calls attention to the fact that Section
53-7 -~-! as passed departed in several respects from the
repealed Section 53-7-8, and that is impossible to determine what the legislature had on its mind in referring to
5:~-~-1~. To cite the changes between 53-7-24 and 53-7-8:
Section 53-7-24 substituted 20 per cent for 25 per cent; it
also left out the reference to the basic unit of $4,050.00
plus transportation ; it also left out the first paragraph of
the repealed Section 53-7-8 consisting of twenty-three
5
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lines. Appellant submits that it is just as reasonable for
the Court to speculate that the legislature intended to
refer directly to the provisions governing bond elections
as to speculate that it was intended to refer to a section
which in turn refers to another section in order to give
it meaning. In fact, this would appear to be the more reasonable interpretation, because Section 53-7-12 must itself
refer to the bond elections in determining the procedure
of the elections. The problem clause in Section 53-7-24
says:
"With the consent of a majority of the electors of
the district voting at an election or elections held
for that purpose in the m.am;ner set forth in Section
53-2-12.'' (Emphasis added)
The word ''manner'' obviously means procedure in the
foregoing, so if we adopt the respondents' argument we
must say that Section 53-7-24 refers election procedures
to 53-7-12 which then refers election procedures to the
section on issuance of bonds. A rather circuitous route
for something that could have been easily spelled out by
the legislature. The appellant agrees that the Court
should help interpret legislation so as to preserve it, but
lacking prophetic vision or psychoanalytic insight the
court cannot decide what the legislature would like to do
had it the power to start all over again- the court should
refuse to legislate, and let the legislature clearly state
its decision with corrective legislation.
The cases where the Court has corrected legislative
errorts are cases of obvious errors, where it was clear
what the legislature had intended to include in various
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Pnnctnwnts and through error had not reflected the true
inlt>nt thnt was patently obvious. In this case it is not
patPntly obvious. Furthermore, those cases correcting
oh,·iolls legislative error constitute an exception of the
.~Pneral rule, which is stated in 50 Am. Jur. Section 232 at
page ~1 !l:
''Courts will not, as a general rule, undertake a
correction of legislative mistakes in statutes. This
principle is adhered to notwithstanding the fact
that the Court may he convinced by extraneous
circumstances that the legislature intended to
enact something very different from that which it
did enact. The question is not what the general
assembly intended to enact, hut what is the meaning- of that which it did enact."
I f. however, we assume the respondents' position for
pnrpo~e~ of argument, i. e. that the Court should supply
the statutory reference in Section 53-7-24 of Section
:l:~-1-12,

we are faced 'vith another problem of determining
what is meant hy the vague and uncertain term "so far
ns applicable:" that is contained in Section 53-7-12. The
pertinent part of Section 53-7-12 reads as follows:
" ... The board of education shall give such reasonable notice of such submission as it may deem
proper, and shall follow the procedure in elections for the issuance of bonds so far as applicable.'' (Emphasis added)
Respondents maintain that if the Court inserts Section
.):~-i-1::! in Section 53-7-24 then the procedures for the election are completely spelled out. Defendants plead in Section i (e) of their answer that they complied with all pro-

I
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visions of law in calling for, conducting, and canvat'~i 11 ~
the result of the election. They also specifically refer to
their compliance so far as applicable with Sections
53-10-3 to 6. Counsel probably intended to refer to Sections 53-10-7 through 53-10-12 since these are the sections
which refer to bond elections, while the sections cited by
the defendants refer to the creation of indebtedness otherwise than through bonding. However, the two sections
(53-10-5 and 53-10-11) on qualification of voters read
essentially the same. Section 53-10-11 reads as follows:
''Every registered voter residing in any municipal ward or school representative precinct in
which any election is held for the purpose of determining the question of issuing bonds for a
school district who shall have paid a property tax
therein in the year next preceding such election
shall he entitled to vote at any such election. Challenges for cause by any qualified voter shall be
allowed at such election and promptly decided
by the judges conducting the same.''
To adopt defendants' theory, the Court would have to
read out the qualification of voters part of the section,
which requires the payment of a property tax, and conclude that the only portion of the section which "is applicable'' is the last sentence on cha1lenges. This would seem
to be a strained interpretation indeed, the effect of which
would he to allow non-property-taxpaying voters such as
college students and others to impose an additional tax on
the property owners of a school district, a violation of our
concept of fundamental rights and due process of law.
It is interesting and significant to note that in the
chapter on creating indebtedness by school districts (the
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dmptPr to whieh 53-7-12 refers) there are no less than
tin• references made to the requirement of property tax
payments in order for voters to invoke additional tax
burdens on property owners. See the following sections
with t lwi r pertinent parts:

53-10-1" ... but no debt in excess of the school taxes for
the current year shall be created by the board of
education of any school district unless the proposition to create such debt shall have been submitted
to a vote of such qualified electors as shall h(Jil}e
paid a property taa; therein within the twelve calendar months n.ext preceding such election. . . . ''
53-10-2'' ... such district may cause the proposition to
incur and create such additional indebtedness to
be submitted to a vote of such qualified electors as
shall have paid a property tax in amy such school
district in the year preceding such election."
53-10-5· · En:-ry registered voter . . . who shall have paid
a property tax in such district in the year next
preceding such election shall be entitled to vote
at any such election .. . "

53-10-11E,·ery registered voter ... who shall have parid a
property tax in such district in the year next p·recedwg such election shall be entitled to vote at amy
such election ... "
9
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53-10-16-( which constitutes the form of the certificate that the County Clerk must sign in connection
with a bond issue) :
"I certify that the within bond is issued in accordance with law, and is within the debt limit permitted by the constitution and laws of the State of
Utah, and in a.ccorda;nce with a vote of the taxpayers of ... "
(Emphasis added)
To read out the property tax requirement of the bonding statutes would be to ignore the provision which
seemed to be most important in the eyes of the legislature.
It would also violate a fundamental rule of law governing taxation legislation. We quote from Su.therlarnd on
Statutory Con.struction, Volume 3, Chapter 67, Section
67-1, at page 993 :
''While the power to tax, and the exercise of that
power is indispensable to the effective operation of
the government, the rule has become firmly established that tax laws are to be strictly construed
against the state a;nd in favor of the taxx;payer.
Therefore, where there is reasonable doubt as to
the meaning of a revenue statute it should be resolved in favor of those taxed.
'' ... A number of theories have been put forth in
sustaining the soundness of the doctrine ... that a
rigid application of revenue measures is for the
protection of the citizen who should be informed
in unambiguous terms the amount and nature of
the tax." (Emphasis added)
Also, see Crawford on Statutory Construction, Section
257, page 502:
''As a general rule, and in accord with the prevailing view revenue laws, and particularly tax
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laws, Hhould be construed in favor of the taxpayer
and against the government. In fact, they are to
be construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer, and
ant! s1tbstantial doubt resolved in favor of the
cit'izen. Hence any tax proceedings must be in
strict accord with the provisions of the statutes
n'lating thereto.
"This view rests, so it would seem, upon the principle that a tax cannot be imposed without the use
of clear and express language. To hold otherwise
would allow the courts to impose taxation, arnd that
would clearly constitute a.n encroachment upon the
power of the legislature. More than that, taxation
is a process which interferes with the personal and
property rights of the people, although it is a necessary interference. But beeause it does take from
the people a portion of their property, seems to be
a "~:alid reason for construing tax laws in favor of
the taxpayer. It is also a destructive power. So
far as property rights are concerned it occupies an
analogo ns position to that occupied by statutes
ll'hich restrict and destroy personal rights. Accordingly, in case of doubt or of ambiguity,. that construction should be adopted which opposes the
imposition of the tax." (Emphasis added)
It is submitted that even if the Court would supply
the reference to 53-7-12 in Section 53-7-24, there still
rt.'mains the problem of determining the meaning of "so
far as applicable.'' The respondents have chosen to
determine that the requirement for a property tax payment is not appliea ble to the leeway election. In view of
the sections cited a hove this would seem to be entirely
contraDT to what the legislature would have intended. It
would also seem to directly contradict the principles of

11
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law governing revenue and taxation statutes :1s dt<'d
above.
POINT II.
THE TITLE OF CHAPTER 104, LAWS OF
UTAH, 1961, (MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM)
DOES NOT MEET THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS, AND THE ACT IS THEREFORE VOID.
The title to Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, reads
as follows:
''MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM''
''An Act Establishing the- State - Supported
Minimum School Program, Stating the CostR
Thereof, Prescribing the Amount of the Contributions to Be Made by the State and the Various
School Districts Toward the Payment of the Costs
Thereof and the Manner in Which the Various
School Districts May Qualify for Participation
Therein; Enabling School Districts to Provide
Additional School Services and Programs; Prescribing the Manner in Which Tax Levies by the
State Shall Be Made for the Purposes of Making
Said Contributions ; Enabling the School Districts
to Make Tax Levies; Providing for the Collection
of Said Tax Levies by the Respective Counties;
Providing for the Distribution of Federal Funds,
and Repealing Sections 53-7-2, 53-7-5, 53-7 -5a,
53-7 -5b, 53-7 -5c, 53-7-6, 53-7-7, and 53-7-8, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. ''
Article VI, Section 23 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah reads as follows:
''Except general appropriation bills, and bills for
the codification and general revision of laws, no
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bill shall be passed containing more than one subjPd, ,.h i('h shall be clearly expressed in its title.''
(Emphasis added)

A <'Hreful examination of the title reveals an obvious
omission of any mention of Section Eleven of the Act,
whi<·h purports to set up the "voted leeway program."
It <·annot he said that the leeway program is just a part
of the ~linimnm School Program, and that therefore it
i~ incltult~d in tlw title. The leeway program is a distinct
method of financing to allow individual school districts to
,·ot<' on how much they wish to contribute for the support
of the basic sehool program provided by the state. It is
~t'parate and distinct, and should be treated as such by
the legislature. This is precisely the type of thing that
Artirl(l VI, Section 23 of the Utah Constitution was dirt'dl'd tow a rd.
While very little is required in a title to satisfy this
safeguard, we cannot find the ''very little''
in the present ease. The law is clearly summarized in
Cra/l'ford, Statutory Construction, Section99, at page 141:
Con~titntional

''As has been previously indicated, the subject or
object or an act must be expressed in its title, and
by virtue of several constitutional provisions it
mnsf be expressed clearly ... After all the title is
in the nature of a label, or mark of identification,
and is intended to give notice of the subject or
object of the act." (Emphasis added)

And in Section 96 of the same work, the author sets
forth the effect of non-compliance :
''Inasmuch as the constitutional provisions with
reference to the title and subject matter of an act

13
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are mandatory, a failure to meet the constitutional
requirements will invalidate the enactment in
whole or in part. The precise extent of the illegality will depend on the degree of the departure
from the constitutional requirement that an nrt
shall contain hut 'one subject which shall be expressed in the title.' However, if two or more diHtinct subjects are expressed in the title, the whole
act will he invalid. Similarly, if the statute is
broader tharn its title, the p•art w/o the scope of the
title will be invalid, or if the part w/o the scope of
the title is so intimately connected with the part
expressed in the title that the former without the
latter does not leave a statute complete in itself
and capable of execution, the entire act will be
invalid. It may, therefore, be stated, as a general
rule, since the title defines the scope of the lOIW,
that an act earn be valid only as to the p·art expressed in the title.'' (Emphasis added)
Since Section 11 of Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961,
is not referred to in the title, the section should be declared void and ineffective.
POINT III.
THE NOTICE CALLING THE ELECTION AS
PUBLISHED BY THE RESPONDENTS WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO APPRAISE THE VOTING PUBLIC AS TO THE ISSUES OF THE
ELECTION, AND THE ELECTION WAS
THEREFORE INVALID.
A general statement of the requirements for a valid
notice is found at 79 C.J.S. Section 366, page 93, which
reads as follows :
''. . . Generally, the contents of a notice must be
such as clearly to inform the electors as to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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question submitted, and as to the purpose ?f the·
proposed issue of bonds ... the bonds to be Issued
need not be discredited nor the purpose of the
i~Huc set forth with too great particularity, if the
votl•r is made reasonably aware of the purpose
and ('osf of the proposed improvement so that he
mnv ('.rcrcise an intelligent and discriminating
jtuf,qmenf as to his own interest and public weifan•. '' (Emphasis added)
Sl't' also

the following cases which amplify the rule stated:

Hellerv. Rounkles, 171 Kan. 323,232 P. 2d 225
Henson v. School District No. 92, 150 Kan. 610, 95
P. 2d 346
Ki·ng v. Independent School Dist. Class A, No. 37,
46 Idaho 800, 272 P. 507.

Respondents plead in their Answer (Paragraph 7e)
that they have complied with the provisions of Section
;):~-10-:~ concerning notice of the election so far as applienhle. The requirements of the notice as set forth in Section 53-10-3 are as follows:
· • (1) The time and place of holding such election.
(2) The name of the judges at each polling place

to conduct such election.
(3) The hours during which the polls shall remain open.
( 4) The amount of indebtedness which the board

proposes to incur or create and for what p~ttr
pose." (Emphasis added)

An examination of the notice as circulated by the Respondents fails to reveal any language which would clear15
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ly inform the voters as to the purpose or cost of tht> proposed program so as to enable them to make an intellig·t·n!
and discriminating choice at the polls. In fact, tlJP 11ot i<'P
skillfully avoids any mention of a tax h,,-)T neces~nry to
support the program. The notice merely makes rl'i'Pl'<'ll<'t'
to Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, in informing the voters of the issues. (See R-23) It would lH'
impossible from reading the notice published by rcspolldents to determine the extent of the expenditures proposed
or the extent to which the taxpayers would face a tnx
increase. The voters are forced to make a decision without knowing how much the tax will he.
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CONCLUSION
In ('OtH'IH~ioH, it is submitted that the leeway election should be declared to be of no force and effect, and
St>dio11 ;->:~-7-:!4 should be declared a nulility. It is the
fundion of the legislature to come forward with a clear
nnd intt•llig-ihle law on matters of such impact and conl't'l'lt, nnd the voters have a right to know the cost of their
ndionR affirming or disaffirming the proposed programs.
It dol'R not seem too much to ask the legislature that it
;o;pt>ll out the correct procedure to be followed in raising
rt>\.l'lltw for public use, and it does not seem too great a
hun!Pn that public officials follow these rules.
Respectfully Submitted,
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN
ARTHUR H. N !ELSEN
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
MORGAN AND PAYNE

J. RuLoN MoRGAN
128 East Center
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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